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Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of coopera-
tion and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for 
defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution 
of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the punishment 
level meted out by individuals in dependence on the cooperation level exhibited by their 
neighbors in a lattice-structured population. We find that (1) cooperation and punishment can 
undergo runaway selection, with evolution towards enhanced cooperation and an ever more 
demanding punishment reaction norm mutually reinforcing each other; (2) this mechanism 
works best when punishment is strict, so that ambiguities in defining defectors are small; (3) 
when the strictness of punishment can adapt jointly with the threshold and severity of pun-
ishment, evolution favors the strict-and-severe punishment of individuals who offer slightly 
less than average cooperation levels; (4) strict-and-severe punishment naturally evolves and 
leads to much enhanced cooperation when cooperation without punishment would be weak 
and neither cooperation nor punishment are too costly; and (5) such evolutionary dynamics 
enable the bootstrapping of cooperation and punishment, through which defectors who never 
punish gradually and steadily evolve into cooperators who punish those they define as defec-
tors. 
Keywords: evolution, strict-and-severe punishment, cooperation, lattice-structured population, 
reaction norm, social norm, psychological response, bootstrapping 
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Understanding the evolution of cooperation is one of the greatest challenges in evolutionary 
biology and the social sciences. Even though several general mechanisms are widely recog-
nized to facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation (as reviewed, e.g., by 
Nowak, 2006), many questions of a more detailed nature are still unresolved. Kin selection 
(Hamilton, 1964) explains the evolution of altruism among relatives. Direct reciprocity in re-
peated interactions (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) and indirect reciprocity enabled by 
reputation dynamics (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; 
Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003; Brandt and Sigmund, 2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004; Na-
kamaru and Kawata, 2004; Takahashi and Mashima, 2006) promote the evolution of 
cooperation among non-relatives. Group selection (e.g., Sober and Wilson, 1998) and selec-
tion shaped by local interactions (e.g., Matsuda, 1987; Nowak and May, 1992; Nakamaru et 
al., 1997, 1998; Le Galliard et al., 2003, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006) may advance cooperation 
in ways that can often be interpreted as generalizations of kin selection (Lehmann et al., 
2007a). 
Cooperation is promoted by the punishment of defectors (Axelrod, 1986; Boyd and Rich-
erson, 1992; Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Rockenbach and 
Milinski, 2006; Sigmund, 2007), and so-called altruistic punishment occurs when the direct 
costs of punishing are outweighed by the indirect benefits of such behavior (Yamagishi, 1986; 
Gintis, 2000; Sigmund et al., 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2003; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a; Gardner and 
West, 2004; Shinada et al., 2004; Fowler, 2005; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2005, 2006; Brandt et 
al., 2006; Henrich et al., 2006; Eldakar et al., 2007; Hauert et al., 2007; Lehmann et al., 
2007b; Eldakar and Wilson, 2008). 
In this study, we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological re-
sponse function, for punishment. This norm determines the threshold of encountered 
cooperation below which individuals punish, how strictly they apply such a threshold, and 
how severely they punish when they do so. In addition, we allow individuals to choose their 
level of cooperation from a continuum of strategies (Doebeli and Knowlton, 1998; Roberts 
and Sherratt, 1998; Wahl and Nowak, 1999a, 1999b; Killingback et al., 1999; Killingback and 
Doebeli, 2002; Le Galliard et al., 2003, 2005; Doebeli et al., 2004). In this way, we examine 
the joint evolution of four continuous strategies determining, respectively, the cooperation 
level and the threshold, strictness, and severity of punishment. Among other questions, this 
allows us to appraise the potential for selfish punishment and strong reciprocity: selfish pun-
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ishers do not cooperate but nevertheless punish non-cooperators, whereas strong reciprocators 
cooperate and punish non-cooperators. Our analysis of joint evolution also allows us to com-
pare our results with a preceding theoretical study suggesting that in a metapopulation setting 
the joint evolution of cooperation and punishment leads to the collapse of cooperation unless 





















Viscous populations, exhibiting local interactions on a lattice or a more general social 
network, have been shown to promote the evolution of continuous cooperation strategies 
(Killingback et al., 1999; Le Galliard et al., 2003, 2005), as well as the joint evolution of dis-
crete strategies of cooperation and punishment (Brandt et al., 2003; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 
2005, 2006). Our study extends this earlier work to the joint and gradual evolution of con-
tinuous strategies of cooperation and punishment. In this wider context, we examine adaptable 
social reaction norms for punishment, analyzing their evolutionary determinants and conse-
quences. 
2.  Methods 
We consider populations in which individuals occupy sites, not all of which in turn have to be 
occupied by individuals. To identify the effects of viscous population structure, we compare 
two situations. In well-mixed populations, individuals interact with  other individuals cho-
sen at random from the entire population. In lattice-structured populations, sites are located on 
a lattice, with each individual occupying a site and interacting with individuals on  
neighboring sites. We used a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, 30 30 sites, 
and the von Neumann neighborhood of 
n
n×
4n =  nearest neighbors. 84 
Each individual i  possesses four adaptive traits ( , , ic 0,ic 0,ip , and ) that can all take 
continuous non-negative values. The cooperation level  determines how much individual i  
invests into cooperation with its neighbors: selfish individuals invest nothing or only a small 
amount, whereas cooperators invest a high amount. The punishment threshold  determines 
the cooperation levels  that individual i  deems sufficient or cooperative ( ), as op-









0,ic< ). Accordingly, selfish individuals with whom 
individual  interacts are confronted with levels of punishment by individual i  that increase 
as their cooperation levels decrease. The punishment severity 
90 
91 i
0,ip  determines the punishment 
level individual i  metes out to individuals with a cooperation level of zero. The punishment 
strictness  determines how sharply punishment by individual  changes around . 
92 
93 
94 is i 0,ic
Each individual  interacts with other individuals i j  on  neighboring sites in two steps: 




according to their punishment strategies. The cooperation strategy of individual i  is given by 





( ) cec i c iC c a c=  , (1) 
with non-negative parameters  and . For ca ce 1ce <  this cost function is decelerating, for 




1ce = 1ce >
The punishment strategy of individual i  is given by its punishment reaction norm, 
0, 0,( ) exp( / ) )i( si i ip c p c= − c  , (2a) 103 
and depends on its punishment threshold , punishment severity 0,ic 0,ip , and punishment 
strictness . This reaction norm describes the punishment level 
104 
is ( )ip c
is
 with which individual 
 responds to a cooperation level c . When punishment strictness  is high, cooperation lev-
els  receive very little punishment, while cooperation levels 
105 
106 i
0,c > ic 0,ic c<  elicit almost the 
maximal punishment level 
107 
0,ip . When punishment strictness  is low, the punishment level 
still monotonically decreases as the cooperation level increases, but the transition to low pun-
ishment is shallower around . For testing the robustness of our results, we also considered 







0,( ) (1 ) i0,/ si i ip c p= − ( )ip c if  and 0,ic c<c c 0=  otherwise, (2b) 112 
113 0, 0,( ) /[1 ) exp( ( /i i i ip c p s s c c= − − +exp( 1))]i −  . (2c) 




( ) pep i p iC p a p=  , (3) 116 
with non-negative parameters  and . For pa pe 1pe <  this cost function is decelerating, for 




1pe = 1pe >







= + ∑  , (4a) 120 
121 is given by the intrinsic birth rate  increased by the average cooperative investment individ-
ual  receives from is neighboring sites (the sums in Eqs. (4) extend over all individuals 
0b
i j  
with whom individual i  interacts, and thus naturally exclude empty sites in the neighborhood 
of individual ). The resultant offspring is placed at a randomly chosen site with which indi-
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 . (4b) 
is given by the intrinsic death rate  increased by the average punishment individual i  re-
ceives and by the average costs for punishment and cooperation individual  incurs. 
0d
i
Birth and death events occur asynchronously across the population and stochastically in 
time. After each such event, the waiting time until the next event is drawn from an exponen-
tial distribution with mean 1/  with E E B D= + , where B  and , respectively, are the 
current sums of all birth and death rates in the population. The event type is then chosen ac-





 and , and the individual  undergoing the event is chosen 








When an offspring is born, its traits may be mutated relative to those of its parent. For 
each trait, a mutation occurs with probability . Mutated trait values are normally distributed 
around the corresponding parental trait values, with standard deviations 
m
cσ  for the traits , 
, and 
c138 
0c 0p , and with standard deviation sσ  for the trait . Mutated values of the traits c , , s 0c139 
0p , and  are constrained to minimal values 0, s
510− , 0, and 0, respectively. These boundaries 
are absorbing for , , and 
140 











For testing the robustness of our results, we also considered errors in the implementation 
and perception of cooperation levels. With implementation errors, an implemented coopera-
tion level differs from the actually intended cooperation level with a small error probability 
and with the difference being drawn from a normal distribution with a small standard devia-
tion. With perception errors, a perceived cooperation level differs from the actually 
implemented cooperation level analogously. 
3.  Results 
Fig. 1 shows how our model leads to runaway selection for costly cooperation and punish-
ment in lattice-structured populations. Here punishment strictness  is not yet freely 
evolving, but instead is kept fixed at one and the same value for all individuals in the popula-
tion. Evolution starts in the absence of any cooperation (
s
0c = ) and of any punishment 
( ). All individuals are initially recognized as defectors (
152 
c0 0p = 510c −0 = > ). In general, run-
away selection among quantitative traits occurs when continual feedback between selection 
pressures and resultant evolutionary changes in the traits gradually leads to ever more extreme 
trait values. In our model, runaway selection occurs among the cooperation level , the pun-





0c 0p , which are all increasing 
concomitantly. We see that the larger  is chosen, i.e., the stricter individuals apply their pun-







population’s average cooperation level  always evolves to be slightly larger than the average 
punishment threshold , so that most individuals are recognized as cooperators by most other 
individuals. Cooperation levels are driven up by evolutionary increases in punishment thresh-
olds and vice versa. In other words, as the population evolves to become increasingly 
cooperative, the social demands on individuals to be recognized as cooperators rise concomi-









p  increases with the punishment strictness . The 
speed of runaway selection thus increases with punishment strictness. Hence, stricter punish-




168 Fig. 2 shows what happens when punishment strictness  is allowed to evolve together 
with the three other adaptive traits c , , and 
s
0c 0p . Again, evolution starts in the absence of 
any cooperation and of any punishment. In addition, individuals are assumed to be initially 
undiscriminating ( ). When the evolution of  is sufficiently fast (i.e., when 
169 
170 
0s = s sσ  is suffi-
ciently large compared to 
171 
cσ ), punishment strictness rises together with all other adaptive 
traits, resulting in a cooperative regime with strict-and-severe punishment. As in Fig. 1, the 
social requirements for avoiding punishment escalate with increasing cooperation. By con-
trast, when evolution of  starts out from 0 but is too slow, punishment strictness remains 
low. Individuals thus continue to be undiscriminating, and runaway selection for cooperation 
and punishment cannot occur (results not shown). However, even when evolution of  is 
slow, a sufficiently high initial value of  reinstates the phenomenon of runaway selection, in 














Fig. 3 shows a systematic evaluation of the consequences of cooperation costs and pun-
ishment costs for the joint evolution of cooperation and punishment. Without punishment 
(i.e., for 0p  fixed at 0), cooperation evolves only when cooperation costs are sufficiently de-
celerating (Fig. 3a). Even then, resultant cooperation levels remain relatively low. Evolving 
punishment, by contrast, can lead to much higher levels of cooperation. This occurs when 
punishment costs are decelerating or linear and cooperation costs are roughly linear (Fig. 3b). 
A look at the three traits determining the punishment strategy (Figs. 3c to 3e) confirms that 
these high levels of cooperation are enabled by the evolution of strict-and-severe punishment: 
the average punishment threshold (Fig. 3c) is again just slightly lower than the average coop-
eration level (Fig. 3b), the average punishment severity is high (Fig. 3d), and the average 














We can categorize and understand these outcomes in terms of four cost scenarios. First, 
when cooperation is too cheap (i.e., cooperation costs are decelerating and  is lower than 
about 0.5), the population’s lattice structure alone is sufficient for promoting cooperation, so 
that costly punishment is not favored. Second, when cooperation is too expensive (i.e., coop-
ce
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eration costs are accelerating and  is higher than about 1.25), cooperation evolution is hin-
dered by these costs, independently of the costs of punishment. Third, when punishment is too 
expensive (i.e., punishment costs are accelerating and  is higher than about 1.25), punish-
ment evolution is hindered by these costs and no enhanced cooperation can thus occur. 
Fourth, when punishment is not too expensive (i.e., punishment costs are linear or decelerat-
ing so that  is lower than about 1.25) and cooperation is neither too cheap nor too 
expensive (i.e., cooperation costs are roughly linear so that  lies between about 0.5 and 







































To test the robustness of our results, we changed the intrinsic birth and death rates,  and 
, without observing any qualitative differences. The patterns reported above also remain 
intact when we use the alternative parameterizations of punishment reaction norms in Eqs. 
(2b) and (2c), instead of the one in Eq. (2a). Also the introduction of implementation and per-
ception errors did not lead to any qualitative changes in the observed evolutionary dynamics. 
When increasing the mutation probability and the mutational standard deviations, we could 
confirm earlier results by Le Galliard et al. (2003) that showed how such changes in the muta-
tion process facilitate the evolution of continuous cooperation strategies. 
0b
0d
For well-mixed populations, the joint evolution of costly cooperation and punishment 
never occurs, as can be shown analytically (see appendix) and corroborated by individual-
based simulations. This result can be understood intuitively: since punishing is costly to the 
punisher, and since in well-mixed populations this cost is the only selection pressure acting on 
punishment severity (see appendix), punishment – and, in its wake, cooperation – are invaria-
bly eliminated from well-mixed populations. 
4.  Discussion 
Here we have shown that the joint and gradual evolution of cooperation and punishment can 
greatly promote cooperation levels in lattice-structured populations, even when cooperation 
and punishment are entirely absent initially. This promotion is driven by runaway selection, 
through which cooperation level, punishment threshold, and punishment severity rise con-
comitantly. The pace of the runaway process increases with punishment strictness. When 
punishment strictness is allowed to evolve, evolution often leads to strict-and-severe punish-
ment accompanied by high cooperation levels. This process is again driven by runaway 
selection, now for all four traits. The enhancement of cooperation levels through the evolution 
of strict-and-severe punishment is largest when neither cooperation nor punishment are too 
costly and cooperation levels in the absence of punishment would be low. Our results explain 
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the bootstrapping of cooperation and punishment, in the sense that defectors who rarely or 
only indiscriminately punish gradually and steadily evolve into cooperators who strictly and 




































The evolutionary mechanisms underlying these findings can be understood in intuitive 
terms. In general, any process of runaway selection requires positive feedback between selec-
tion pressures and resultant evolutionary changes in one trait and selection pressures and 
resultant evolutionary changes in another trait. In our model, such mutual reinforcement can 
occur among all four evolving traits, as we have schematically summarized in Fig. 4. We start 
our explanation by recalling that lattice-structured populations enable the evolution of low 
levels of cooperation even in the absence of punishment (arrow a in Fig. 4). When punishment 
strictness is small but does not vanish completely, these cooperation levels favor increased 
punishment severity (arrow b). Under these conditions, punishment locally reduces the fre-
quency of individuals with relatively low cooperation level, by differentially burdening them 
with a fitness disadvantage. Consequently, any region on the lattice in which punishment se-
verity slightly differs from zero can expand into adjacent regions with vanishing punishment 
severity. Increased punishment severity then favors increased cooperation levels (arrow c), 
since these are advantageous when punishment reduces the exposure of more cooperative in-
dividuals to exploitation by less cooperative individuals. In turn, increased cooperation levels 
again favor increased punishment severity (arrow b), since this maintains the relative impact 
of punishment on fitness after cooperation levels have risen. Increased cooperation levels also 
favor increased punishment thresholds (arrow d), since this maintains the discriminating of 
individuals with relatively low cooperation levels after cooperation levels have risen. In turn, 
increased punishment thresholds favor increased cooperation levels (arrow e), since individu-
als must then cooperate more to escape punishment. Under these conditions, selection favors 
an increase in punishment strictness (arrow f), since this enables a better targeting of punish-
ment to individuals with relatively low cooperation levels. In turn, stricter punishment 
strengthens the already described selection pressures on cooperation level, punishment 
threshold, and punishment severity (arrow g), since stricter punishment selects for enhanced 
cooperation and tougher punishment. 
These explanations help us to appreciate why runaway selection for cooperation and 
strict-and-severe punishment does not occur for all parameter values and initial conditions 
considered in our analysis. First, when the costs of cooperation or punishment are too high 
(upper and right regions in Figs. 3b to 3e), the selection pressures described above (arrows b 
to e in Fig. 4) are counteracted by those directly resulting from the costs, thus stalling the run-
away process at low levels of cooperation and punishment. Second, when cooperation levels 
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are high already in the absence of punishment (left regions in Figs. 3b to 3e), the relative ad-
vantages of punishment, and therefore the corresponding selection pressures on punishment 
(arrows b and d in Fig. 4), are low, thus stalling punishment evolution at low levels. Third, the 
initial selection pressure on punishment severity (arrow b in Fig. 4) occurs unless punishment 
is totally absent from the initial population. For the punishment reaction norms in Eq. (2b) the 
initial punishment threshold must thus exceed the initial cooperation level, since otherwise no 
punishment occurs at all. Fourth, for selection to favor stricter and severer punishment (ar-
rows b, d, and f in Fig. 4), more cooperation has to result in less punishment, which implies 
that the punishment reaction norm must be a decreasing function. A vanishing punishment 
severity translates into a flat punishment reaction norm (Eqs. 2), which prevents the runaway 
process from taking off. Conversely, this explains why increased punishment strictness accel-
erates the runaway process of the three other traits (Fig. 1) and why rapidly evolving 




































Our representation of cooperation and punishment strategies as continuous quantitative 
traits and the consideration of their gradual evolutionary dynamics play an important role for 
the findings reported here. In particular, the evolutionary mechanisms underlying the runaway 
process cause the steady and gradual adjustment of trait values driven by the subtle mutual 
reinforcement of selection pressures. In contrast, large sudden increases in punishment 
threshold or severity might not be selectively advantageous, since the resultant costs may 
outweigh the resultant benefits. Likewise, large sudden increases in cooperation levels are 
unlikely to be favored, since these would not be backed up by a corresponding orchestration 
of the punishment strategy. This highlights why cooperation games with continuous strategies 
and gradual trait evolution can reveal qualitative phenomena, such as the runaway selection 
for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment reported here, that might be fundamentally 
obscured in corresponding games with discrete strategies. 
Our results provide an evolutionary explanation for the widely observed appreciation of 
“strict but fair” punishment. This common cultural predisposition is an integral part of many 
moral systems and legal codes, and is often touted as a highly effective approach to education, 
reeducation, military discipline, and the preservation of public order. Strict-and-severe pun-
ishment is closely related to the “zero tolerance” approach to law enforcement, by which 
already small infractions of accepted rules are subjected to significant punishment. In our 
model, these ethical considerations have their counterpart in the emergence of high punish-
ment strictness, elevated punishment severity, and of punishment thresholds finely tuned to 
majority behavior. In fact, our results presented in Figs. 1 to 3 make it clear that effective pun-
ishment must operate on shifting baselines, with the criterion for punishment being 
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continually refined as majority behavior evolves. Like in many other models of cooperation 
and punishment, these outcomes arise, gradually and naturally, from evolutionary dynamics 




































Based on these insights, we can revisit two conditions that could be perceived as limiting 
the bootstrapping of cooperation and punishment in our model. We had already explained 
above why runaway selection is hindered by vanishing initial punishment strictness, and, 
while punishment strictness is still low, by its low evolutionary rate. Notice that these obser-
vations only apply when punishment strictness is zero or very low initially. We can now 
question whether that would indeed be a realistic assumption. At least in humans, it seems fair 
to assume, instead, that innate or cultural circumstances are causing punishment strictness to 
start out from some intermediate level, even when punishment severity and punishment 
threshold start out from zero. Our results and explanations above make it clear that, under 
such conditions, runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment is 
greatly facilitated. 
Here we have studied situations in which the punishment that individuals mete out simply 
depends on the cooperation levels of the individuals they interact with. Yet, punishment re-
sponses may be affected by many other factors. For example, breaking a social norm that is 
widely shared among members of a group may invite punishment (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Fis-
chbacher, 2004b), an effect that may be superimposed on the punishment responses 
considered here. Also emotions can influence punishment behavior, and may compel indi-
viduals to punish cheaters even when the cost of punishment exceeds that of being cheated 
(Frank, 1988; Xiao and Houser, 2005). Considering the effects of reputation or gossip on run-
away selection for cooperation and punishment will also be of interest, since reducing an 
individual’s reputation can serve as a cost-free means of punishment (Nakamaru and Kawata, 
2004). Similarly, it will be worthwhile taking a closer look at conditions and mechanisms that 
can eventually stop the runaway process investigated here. This could involve cost functions 
that are decelerating for low investments and accelerating for high investments, diminishing 
fitness returns from received investments, or an explicit modeling of the availability of re-
sources that individuals exchange when they cooperate or punish. 
The evolutionary framework we have utilized here recognizes three levels of interlocking 
dynamics, ranging from the demographic dynamics of individuals in a population, to the be-
havioral dynamics of cooperation and punishment in the interactions between individuals, and 
to the psychological dynamics underlying the identification of cheaters. Naturally, psycho-
logical dynamics affect behavioral dynamics, which in turn affect demographic dynamics. 
Conversely, demographic dynamics affect behavioral and psychological dynamics by chang-
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ing the selection pressures that cause adjustments in the traits governing behavior and psy-
chology. Experimental tools and modeling approaches for studying such feedbacks have 
emerged over the past decades and are now increasingly applied to tackling questions in co-
operation research (e.g., de Quervain et al., 2004; Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2005). We hope that 
the framework and results put forward here may further inspire and facilitate such studies. In 
a similar vein, our approach could be used to address questions raised by evolutionary psy-
chologists who have challenged conjectured adaptive explanations of behavior and 
psychological predispositions regarding mate choice, emotion, cheater detection, and the abil-
ity to recognize spatial locations (e.g., Bawkow et al., 1992). While such explanations are 
often based on verbal and qualitative reasoning, the approach adopted here allows for formal 





























It is our hope that, from a methodological perspective, our evolutionary explanation of 
runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment might be no more than a 
start. We believe that, more in general, studies of cooperation have much to gain from inves-
tigating models with joint evolution of multiple continuous traits, explicit dynamics for 
demography and trait changes, and interpretation of traits in terms of reaction norms for psy-
chological and behavioral processes. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we show that cooperation and punishment cannot evolve in well-mixed 
populations. For this purpose we investigate the dynamics of a rare variant strategy with fre-
quency , cooperation level , and punishment reaction norm 0x′ ≈ c′ p′  in the population of a 
resident strategy with frequency 
362 
x , cooperation level c , and punishment reaction norm p , 363 
0 0
1 ( )(1 ) { [ ( ) ( ( )) ( )]p c
dx b cx x d p c C p c C c x
x dt
′ }′ ′ ′= + − − + + +′  . 364 
 12
We assume that the resident population is at its equilibrium frequency ˆ0 1x≤ ≤ , so that 
, from which we obtain 
365 
ˆ366 0 0ˆ ˆ( )(1 ) [ ( ) ( ( )) ( )]p cb cx x d p c C p c C c x+ − = + + +
21
0 02ˆ [ 4 ( ) ]cx l c b d l= + − −  with . Denoting the variant’s 
per capita growth rate or fitness (
0 ( ) ( ( )) ( )pl b c p c C p c C c= − + + +
/ ) /dx dt x
c367 ′ ′
 by f ′  (e.g., Metz et al., 1992), the selection 
pressures , , , and 
368 
cg 0cg 0pg sg  on the resident’s adaptive traits c , , 0c 0p , and  are given by 
the derivatives , , 
s369 
/df dc′ ′ df 0′ ′/ dc 0/df dp′ ′ /df ds, and ′ ′  evaluated at c c′ =  and p p′ =  (e.g., 













ˆ [ ( ) (
ˆ ( ( )) ,
ˆ ( ( )) ,








g xc sc c p c e C c
g xsc c e C p c
g xp e C p c





= −= −= −=
 
Since  is negative, evolution will always diminish punishment severity 
0p
g 0p  in well-mixed 
populations. Once 
373 
0p  has evolved to 0, selection on  and  ceases:  and thus 
 and . The selection pressure on  is negative for 
0c s
p
(0p ) 0C =374 
0c
g = 0 0sg = c 0 0= , , so 
that, driven by the cost of cooperation, the cooperation level  will also evolve to 0. 
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Figures and captions 500 
 501 
502 Figure 1. Joint evolution of cooperation level c , punishment threshold , and punishment 
severity 
0c
0p , when punishment strictness  is kept fixed. Panels (a) to (e) show the average 
evolved punishment reaction norms (continuous curves) and corresponding average evolved 





100,000=  for five different fixed values of pun-
ishment strictness  (0.5, 1, 5, 10, and 1000). Panel (f) shows the average evolved values of 
 (thick continuous curve),  (thin continuous curve), and 
505 
506 s
c 0c 0p  (dashed curve) as functions of 
 (varying along the horizontal axis). All results are averaged over fifty model runs in the lat-
tice-structured population. Runaway selection for cooperation and punishment accelerates 
with punishment strictness, leading to much elevated cooperation levels (for comparison: 






0 0p = , the average cooperation level equilibrates 
at merely ). The initial values of c
511 
1.6≈c 0=  and 0p 0=  are chosen so as to highlight the 
bootstrapping of cooperation and punishment, i.e., their gradual and steady evolution in popu-
lations in which cooperation and punishment are entirely absent initially. The initial value of 
 means that all individuals are initially recognized as defectors. The initial fre-










0 2b = , d0 1= , , 0.2=ca 1ce = , 0.3pa = , 0.5pe = , 0.01m = , and 1cσ = . 517 
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 518 
519 Figure 2. Joint evolution of cooperation level c , punishment threshold , punishment sever-
ity 
0c
0p , and punishment strictness s . Panels (a) to (c) show the average evolved punishment 
reaction norms (continuous curves) and corresponding average cooperation levels (vertical 
arrows) at times 10, 100, and 100,000. Panel (d) shows the evolutionary dynamics of  
(thick continuous curve),  (thin continuous curve), 
520 
521 
522 t = c
0c 0p  (dashed curve), and  (dotted 
curve). The initial value of  implies an essentially flat reaction norm. Other parame-
ters and settings are as in Fig. 1, with the addition of 
s523 
524 0.01=s
10sσ = . 525 
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 526 
527 Figure 3. Effects of cooperation and punishment costs on the joint evolution of cooperation 
level , punishment threshold , punishment severity c 0c 0p , and punishment strictness . 
When the exponent  ( ) is small, equal to 1, or large, costs for cooperation (punishment) 
are decelerating, linear, or accelerating. Decelerating (accelerating) costs imply that high lev-
els of cooperation or punishment are relatively cheap (expensive). Panel (a) shows the 









0p  is fixed at 0). Panels (b) to (e), respectively, show the average evolved values of , 
, 
c533 
0c 0p , and  as functions of  (varying along the horizontal axes) and  (varying along 
the vertical axes). Other parameters and settings are as in Fig. 2. 






Figure 4. Schematic summary of positive feedbacks resulting in runaway selection for coop-
eration and strict-and-severe punishment. 
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